Tuesday, July 20, 2004
There's another side of the e-voting issue
Everything is all right, according to the Information Technology Industry Association. They say that the security researchers and professors who want better quality in voting machines are engaging in a "religious war" and that 77% of the voters they surveyed like the idea of computerized voting machines.
What can a non-expert think, when computer people don't agree?
The first thing to notice is that the ITAA is getting distracted by a small part of the problem. One issue is whether we the people will be able to look at the computer programs that count our votes (and that we paid for). That issue is what the ITAA means when they talk about "open source" versus "closed source". Open source or closed, a system can be usefully secure if enough trained people review it and if it offers ways to check its results.
Auditing features are completely missing or inadequate on today's e-voting systems. That's right -- there's no way to check whether they made an error. How do you do a recount if there's no paper to count?
The second thing to notice is that critics of first-generation e-voting machines come from all over. Gadfly Bev Harris, for example, didn't come from the "open source movement".
There's an old saying in business, "you can expect what you inspect". Apply that wisdom to voting machines. Demand independent certification. Voting is too important to accept a vendor saying "trust me".
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What can a non-expert think, when computer people don't agree?
The first thing to notice is that the ITAA is getting distracted by a small part of the problem. One issue is whether we the people will be able to look at the computer programs that count our votes (and that we paid for). That issue is what the ITAA means when they talk about "open source" versus "closed source". Open source or closed, a system can be usefully secure if enough trained people review it and if it offers ways to check its results.
Auditing features are completely missing or inadequate on today's e-voting systems. That's right -- there's no way to check whether they made an error. How do you do a recount if there's no paper to count?
The second thing to notice is that critics of first-generation e-voting machines come from all over. Gadfly Bev Harris, for example, didn't come from the "open source movement".
There's an old saying in business, "you can expect what you inspect". Apply that wisdom to voting machines. Demand independent certification. Voting is too important to accept a vendor saying "trust me".