The Security Mentor

Or, what should you look for when your local government selects electronic voting equipment?

Princeton research Ed Felten and David Wagner list requirements for a secure voting machine.

Today's voting machines are regular Windows PCs running some voting software. Think about the reliability and security problems on your home machine. Then think about what a crook would do to win a national election.

The high points of their recommendations are:

• No removable memory cards. Some machines store votes on removable memory cards which is bad because, well, you can remove them. Or you can stuff the ballot box by preloading votes. Or you can store unwanted programs for the voting machine on them.
• Vote on one machine, count on another. Use a touch screen for accessibility but have it print out a guaranteed-valid optical scan ballot. Put that into a scanner that does the counting and nothing else.
• Keep it simple. Straightforward hardware that can't be cleverly reprogrammmed is safer.
• Audit everything. Before, during, and after the election the inner workings of the machines should be checked, their accuracy should be checked, and their results should be compared with the paper in spot checks of selected precincts

My analysis? I agree with every word.

Just one thing, though, there's a weird problem with some touch screens where you press the button for one candidate and get a different one. Apparently accidental: the machines need to be reset to know how to line up touches on the screen with what they're displaying.